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Recent rapid institutional reforms in the financial sector and fast economic growth 
make China a special case for studying the spatial evolution of banking system in the 
particular circumstances. Drawing on data from China’s four big state-owned banks in 
the nation’s largest less-developed, yet rapidly growing interior province of Henan, this 
paper reveals that the spatial evolution of the regional banking system did not follow the 
“stages of banking development” theory developed in the literature. The regional 
banking system started from a fairly even spread of national bank branches and moved 
towards a geographical concentration in the urban centers. Institutional reforms, 
particularly government deregulation and bank re-organization played a crucial role in 
driving the changes. Along with diminishing government controls, spatial economic 
difference directly determined the locations of bank branches. This was proved at high 
significance levels in the pooled OLS and Fixed Effect regression models. The 
questionnaire interviews with 58 bank branches further supported the findings. We 
argue that the different banking practices in the specific institutional background of 
China may extend the “stages of banking development” theory based on evidence from 
the Western economies.
Key Words: Regional Financial System, Bank Locations, Institutional Reform, China, 
Henan.
INTRODUCTION
Financial geography has long focused on global and national issues, such 
as globalization, international or national financial centers, and national 
financial systems (Porteous, 1995; Leyshon and Thrift, 1997; Martin, 1999a; 
Clark, 2005). Theoretical and empirical work on geographical studies of 
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sub-national financial systems is limited. The few exceptions in sub-national 
studies draw exclusively on evidence from the developed economies, either 
focusing on the metropolitan areas (Polese and Shearmur, 2004; Marshall, 
2004; Zhao et al., 2004), the regional inequality of financial services (Klagge 
and Martin, 2005; Martin et al., 2005), or the financial practice relevant to the 
local economy (Lee, 1999; Tickell, 2000). Yet the relevant issues in the less 
developed economies, particularly in the less developed regions in these 
nations, remain one of the least explored aspects in financial geography.
Based on evidence from the developed economies, many researchers have 
observed the increasing institutional and geographical concentration of the 
financial system (e.g., Martin, 1999a; Klagge and Martin, 2005), although 
differences still exist among nations (Carnevali, 1996; Tickell, 2000). Some 
scholars have developed a “stages of banking development” theory to 
illustrate the spatial evolution of the financial system (Chick, 1986; Dow, 
1999). Starting from local and regional banking, this evolution is moving 
towards centralization in global centers (Martin, 1999b). Underlying these 
stages, the trends of development are both geographical expansion of some 
individual banks and concentration of banking services in some localities. 
This may be true from the perspective of historical evolution in a market 
economy. But the situation may differ in some special contexts. For example, 
due to the special roles played by state regulations, banking development in 
the transitional economy may not closely follow the tendencies identified. 
China is a transitional economy which has experienced rapid institutional 
changes in its banking system since economic reforms commenced in 1978. 
In the traditional planned economy, financial operation and management 
were highly centralized. One state-owned bank, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBC), controlled money supply, and managed all banking and savings 
activities. More importantly, PBC had a planning function, serving as the 
accounting agency for the whole planned economy. Thus, the bank 
branches at various levels corresponded and adhered to the hierarchies of 
government administration. Since 1978, and especially since the early 1990s, 
market-oriented reforms of state-owned banks (SOBs) have taken place in 
China. At the first stage of this process, four specialized SOBs, namely the 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and the Construction Bank of China 
(CBC), were established between 1979 and 1985. After the separation of their 
commercial functions, the PBC became the nation’s central bank. Along 
with government relinquishment of direct control over the financial 
industry and relaxation of restrictions on new entrants in the early 1990s, the 
SOBs have been granted greater autonomy and have been gradually 
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transforming into true commercial banks. The division of financial services 
among the four specialized banks has diminished. Other financial 
institutions, such as joint-stock banks, city commercial banks and private 
banks, have also emerged. Thus, to strengthen their competitiveness, the 
state banks have been working to reorganize and re-engineer themselves, 
with stress on being customer-oriented, restructuring traditional 
organization and improving their business processes (Chen and Shih, 2004).  
Several other factors also characterize the operational background of 
Chinese banking system. First, the state-owned national banks still 
dominate the banking system in China. The four big SOBs (ICBC, ABC, 
BOC, CCB), are the mainstay of the country’s banking sector. Although their 
dominance is declining, in 2004 they still held a combined share of 54 per 
cent of total banking assets, 60 per cent of the total domestic lending market, 
and attracted 69 per cent of all deposits in the national banking sector 
(Financial Society of China, 2005). Second, China has a large regional 
disparity in its economic development. Some less developed regions have 
recently experienced very fast growth, while other relatively well 
developed regions have grown only slowly (Lu and Sit, 1997). These 
changing patterns of regional economic development may have affected the 
regional banking system. Third, foreign financial firms have gradually been 
permitted to establish their subsidiaries in China following its accession to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation, 2002). However, these foreign banks have operated 
in only a few designated urban districts in the coastal cities. The large inland 
areas were not directly affected by foreign banks until regional restrictions 
were lifted in late 2006. Fourth, the technology adopted in the Chinese 
banking industry is less advanced than that in developed countries, 
although equipment has improved significantly in recent years (Chen and 
Tang, 2003). Internet and telephone banking is still not popular among 
Chinese customers. 
Against this unique background, this paper attempts to examine the 
spatial evolution of regional banking systems in China. In particular, it aims 
to explore how the banking system has responded to rapid institutional 
reforms in the banking industry. In doing so, we select the less developed 
but fast growing and large interior province of Henan as a study case. The 
weak influence of globalization on this province and its relatively low level 
of economic development provide a good case to test the impacts of 
institutional reforms on the early stages of evolution in its banking system. 
By using data collected from Henan, the following specific questions will be 
investigated: What is the changing geography of the banking system in a 
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less developed area of a developing country? Will it follow the stages theory 
based on evidence from the developed economies? What are the major 
determinant factors behind the changes? What roles can institutional 
reforms play in determining the pattern of a regional banking system? 
The remainder of the paper is divided into six sections. The next section 
discusses the research frameworks used in the study, stressing the role of 
institutions and institutional changes in shaping the financial system and 
the stages of banking development. Section Tree elaborates on the selection 
criteria for the case study area and data collection. Section Four examines 
the spatial evolution of the banking system in the study area. The next two 
sections present respectively a quantitative and a qualitative analysis of 
factors which determined these spatial changes. The final section brings the 
paper to its conclusions.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
Institutional changes and the regional banking system 
A banking system can be examined at different geographical scales, such 
as the local, the regional, and the national. In this paper, however, we define 
a regional banking system as the spatial structure of subsidiary banking 
units (such as branches) in a sub-national region. Many factors may affect 
the formation and evolution of a regional financial system, including the 
income levels of local residents (Corbridge and Thrift, 1994), the status of 
economic growth, the difference in information availability (Porteous, 1995 
and 1999), government regulation policies, technological changes in the 
banking sector, globalising processes (Martin, 1999b), and social, cultural 
and institutional factors (Thrift, 1994). All factors have their influences; 
notwithstanding, some factors may play more significant roles in a specific 
context. For example, the rapid institutional changes in China’s banking 
industry since 1978 may have played a special role in determining the 
banking system in relevant regions. 
Institutions can be defined in various ways. In most cases, institutions 
refer to the agents that provide financial services, such as bankers, stock 
exchanges and so forth in financial geography (Martin, 1999b). But in 
institutional economics, institutions are rules of the game. They are made up 
of formal constraints (such as constitutions, laws, rules and regulations), 
informal constraints (such as norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed 
codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics (North, 1994). Since 
informal constraints are unlikely to change in the short-term, we use the 
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term institutions in a specific sense in this research, including financial 
institutions and government regulations for the banking sector. 
Institutional changes therefore refer to changes in government regulations 
and institutional re-organization in response to the changes. We consider 
that government and financial institutions are two important aspects of 
institutional reforms in the banking sector. 
Institutions and their transformation play significant roles in shaping the 
regional banking system. The different financial functions and institutional 
forms have different locational patterns; some tend to be widely distributed, 
such as retail banking, while others are more spatially concentrated, such as 
bank headquarters. In addition, different financial institutions may also 
have different spatial organization. For example, banks with a national 
branch system differ significantly from those with local or regional banking 
systems in relation to a particular region. The latter tend to be more rooted 
in, and committed to, the local community than do the local branches of 
national banks (Martin, 1999b). To adjust to various types of competition, 
the organizational transformation of banks occurs frequently. This may 
result in changes in bank’s locational structure as well as in the regional 
banking system. 
No financial institutions can operate entirely in their own interests; they 
are subject to government policies and regulations. Government policies 
and regulations may affect the regional banking system in many aspects. 
Firstly, they may promote or restrict the overall growth of the banking 
industry in a particular region. For example, government preferential 
policies may promote growth of financial centers in some countries (Clark, 
2002); government regulation on prohibiting establishment of inter-regional 
banking branches (Odell, 1992) may restrict development of financial 
industry in peripheral areas.  Secondly, the changes of relevant regulations 
may result in regional reorganization of the banking system. This can be 
seen in some countries with a localized banking tradition, such as the United 
States, Germany, France, and Italy. Recent deregulation there has resulted in 
significant changes in financial systems (Carnevill, 1996; Martin, 1999a). 
Thirdly, some special policies may improve the uneven distribution of 
financial services. For instance, the Community Reinvestment Act in the 
United States has provided a strong incentive for financial institutions to 
develop services in the areas with financial exclusion. Similar policies have 
also been initiated in Britain to improve access to financial services in 
deprived urban areas (Marshall, 2004). 
These general estimations shed light on exploring the special case under 
the different background. But relevant literature does not cover the impact 
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of rapid institutional changes on regional banking systems. The dramatic 
changes from tightly-governmental control to following market principles 
in China’s banking industry since 1978, for example, needs a specific 
exploration. As discussed earlier, in the tightly-planned period, banks were 
actually the accounting departments of the central government. Thus, 
government preference should determine regional patterns of the banking 
system. Alongside the transition to a market economy, institutional changes 
may likely have affected the regional banking system in the following 
special ways. (1) Government deregulation has created a new operational 
environment for financial institutions. The SOBs are gradually being 
converted into truly independent financial entities. Being guided by 
market-based principles of finance rather than following instructions from 
governments, the banks should have undergone many changes in locational 
structures. (2) The release of government’s direct control over the financial 
industry has generated establishment of other kinds of financial institutions, 
such as joint-stock banks, city commercial banks, credit cooperatives, and 
private banks. Thus, the regional banking system may have become 
diversified. (3) To survive from the strong competition with other banks, the 
SOBs should have been restructuring their inefficient organizational 
hierarchies that were inherited from the planned economy. 
Under these circumstances, one important assumption needs to be tested. 
The market force has replaced government control as a dominant factor in 
regional banking development. With acceptance of this assumption, 
following changes in the spatial organization of individual banks and the 
regional banking systems should have presumably occurred. (1) Bank 
locations should change from a significant difference from where they 
should be in the market economy to somehow reflect the market rules after 
the progressive liberalization of the economic system in 1978. (2) Relatively 
even distribution of bank branches among the administrative units should 
be observed in the planned period, while a centralization tendency may 
appear after 1978 to pursue the large pool of banking customers in particular 
locations. (3) Many new banks and bank branches should be established to 
meet the needs of regional economic development. Thus, the regional 
difference of banking services may increase in the study period. These 
presumptions will be tested in the case of Henan province. 
The stages of spatial development of banking systems
Some scholars have developed a framework to describe spatial patterns of 
banking development. Based on the view that any banking system is a 
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product of history and evidence from UK, Chick (1986) introduced a “stages 
of banking development” theory to reveal the underlying logic in banking 
development. Dow (1999) further developed the spatial composition of the 
stages of banking development. The six stages of banking development and 
their spatial implications can be summarized as (1) serving local 
communities, (2) market expansion at regional level, (3) development of the 
banking system at national level, (4) development overseas, (5) competition 
at national level with non-bank financial institutions and concentration of 
financial activity in particular national centers, and (6) international 
competition and concentration in global financial centers (Dow, 1999). 
Though different banking systems may go through stages differently, 
each regional or national banking system develops according to a common 
logic. That is in the market economy, bank evolves to meet the needs of 
traders, borrowers and lenders. Either geographical expansion of individual 
banks or concentration of banking services in some localities is a process 
whereby the banks increase their market capacity. The particular behavioral 
and institutional framework within which the government regulates the 
banking system also plays an important role.
How is the situation if, under the special circumstances, the banks 
develop by following government preference rather than market rules? 
How will the dramatic institutional changes affect the stages of banking 
development? For example, in the traditional planned economy, 
government tightly controlled financial institutions; the purpose of bank’s 
operation was mainly to provide public services. Institutional reforms since 
1979 have encouraged banks to move towards the common logic of bank 
operation in the market economy. Some other background may also affect 
the stages of banking development in China. (1) The history of banking 
development is very short. There were only few bank branches in China’s 
inland regions before 1949 (Zhang, 1957). (2) The national branch system 
was the tradition in China’s banking development. Even before 1949, few 
national banks and foreign banks dominated the country’s banking service 
(Zhang, 1957). The situation continued afterward although some local 
banks have been established recently. Will these specialties produce a 
different outcome in stages of spatial development of the regional banking 
system? This will be explored in the following study.   
RESEARCH AREA AND DATA 
　　
Henan Province is located in the central part of China, and is the nation’s 
largest province in terms of population (93 million in 2005) and the largest 
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inland province in terms of economic size (RMB 855.4 billion yuan of GDP in 
2004, with one US dollar equivalent to RMB 8.06 yuan, the only inland 
province among the national top five provinces in GDP). We selected this 
province to examine the spatial changes in the banking system for the 
following reasons. Firstly, its economic development maintained a low level 
by national standards. The province’s per capita GDP was 7570 yuan in 
2003, in the lower medium range of the nation’s 31 provinces and 
municipalities (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2004). Secondly, its 
global influence remained relatively weak. For example, both its foreign 
direct investment and its total value of international trade as proportions of 
GDP were the lowest among the six central Chinese provinces in 2003 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2004). Thirdly, Henan was an 
important destination for state investment under the planned economy. 
Even in 2003, the state-owned sector still contributed 54.4 per cent of its total 
GDP, compared with 44.9 per cent for the national average and 25.2 and 19.5 
per cent in coastal Guangdong and Zhejiang Provinces respectively 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2004). Finally, its economic growth 
rates have been very high in past few years. The annual average GDP 
TABLE 1. THE SHARES OF THE FOUR BIG SOBS IN THE TOTAL OF BANKING INDUSTRY IN 
HENAN PROVINCE IN 2002~2003 (RMB million yuan, %) 
Notes: 1) ICBC, BOC, ABC and CCB refer to Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of 
China, Agricultural Bank of China and China Construction Bank respectively. 
            2) The joint-stock banks include Bank of Communications, CITIC Industrial Bank, China 
Everbright Bank, China Merchant Bank, Pudong Development Bank. Other financial 
institutions include city commercial banks, city credit unions, rural credit unions, and 
national policy banks (Agricultural Development Bank, National Development Bank). 
Sources: Jinan Branch of Chinese People’s Bank, 2003, 2004: Yearbook of Jinan Branch of Chinese 
People’s Bank 2003, 2004. Beijing: China Financial and Economic Pres
Banks















ABC 112761 14 120482 12 17 17 17 17
BOC 69758 9 81765 8 9 7 10 7
CCB 87684 11 100128 10 14 8 13 8
ICBC 140715 18 155132 15 22 18 20 17
Four State-owned 
Banks
410918 52 457507 45 62 50 60 49
Joint-stock banks 82934 11 130347 13 13 9 15 12
Other financial 
institutions
289479 37 426307 42 25 41 25 39
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growth rate from 1996 to 2003 in the province was 13.1 per cent, much 
higher than the national average (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
1999; 2004). Henan is therefore a good case for testing the impact of 
institutional reforms on the regional banking system in the less developed 
areas of China. 
The four big SOBs hold a similar dominant position in Henan as in the 
country as a whole. The total assets of the four banks amounted to 457 
billion yuan in 2003, or 45 per cent of the total financial sector of the 
province, albeit a slight decline from its share of 52 per cent in 2002. The total 
lending of the four banks was 49 per cent while the total deposits were over 
60 per cent of the provincial total in 2003 (Table 1).
Statistical data on the banking industry in China only cover those at 
national or provincial levels. Regional and systematic data in a relatively 
long period are rarely available. Therefore, we collected data in this research 
from the following sources. (1) We visited the Henan Banking Regulatory 
Bureau and collected detailed data about the branches of the four big 
stated-owned banks from 1949 to 2003. We also talked with the senior 
administrators of the Bureau and learned about the development 
background of the banking industry in Henan Province since 1949. (2) We 
then interviewed the senior officials from the four banks’ head offices in 
Henan Province respectively in July and December 2004. Particular 
attention was paid to the organizational changes in their banking systems, 
and the criteria for determining the location of their branches. (3) By 
reference to the above information, we sampled bank branches for 
surveying. In July 2004, 50 branches of the four banks in Zhengzhou city, the 
capital of Henan Province, were randomly selected. This represented 12 
percent of the total branches of the four banks. On the basis of operation 
duration and spatial concentration, eight branches in three concentration 
TABLE 2. SAMPLE BRANCHES OF THE FOUR BIG SOBS IN ZHENGZHOU, HENAN 
PROVINCE 
Notes: See table 1 for the full names of the abbreviations of the four bank.
Banks Total Branches Samples %
ICBC 143 20 14.0
ABC 105 13 12.4
BOC 68 11 16.2
CCB 107 14 13.1
Total 423 58 13.7
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areas were further added to the samples. The sample branches and their 
representation were summarized in Table 2.      
In July and August 2004, by the assistance of our postgraduate students 
we surveyed the samples with a pre-designed survey form. The form 
included basic information on a branch and the questions regarding its 
location selection, operational problems, and main targeted customers. The 
people who were surveyed were mostly the managers of the branches. For 
the branches established before 1978, we also interviewed the ex-managers 
of the branches. The data from the surveys provided important qualitative 
accounting for the changes in the banking system in the study area.
The data on all the branches of the four banks in Henan Province, as well 
as the city of Zhengzhou, were spatially processed by using ARCGIS 
software. This has resulted in several maps illustrating the spatial evolution 
of banking system in the whole province as well as in the capital city (Fig. 1, 
Source: Authors’ collection from the relevant government authorities.
Note: The bars from left to right in order represent the period 1979~1985, 1986~1992, and 1993~2003.
FIGURE 1. LOCATIONS OF FOUR STATE-OWNED BANKS IN HENAN PROVINCE IN THREE 
PERIODS OF 1979~1985, 1986~1992, AND 1993~2003.
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Fig 3). The data were also used for the quantitative analysis. The 
quantitative and qualitative results are supplementary to each other, 
providing support for our arguments in the study. 
THE CHANGING GEOGRAPHY OF BANKING SYSTEMS IN HENAN
In terms of institutional structure, the banking system in China has 
undergone four periods since 1949. They are (1) the period of the highly 
centralized financial system (1949~1978); (2) the period of the establishment 
of four SOBs (1979~1985); (3) the period of the specialized banking system 
(1986~1992) which was dominated by the four specialized state banks; and 
(4) the period of the commercialized banking system (1993~) during which 
the specialized banks were switched to commercial banks while other types 
of banks were emerging. The four periods were used in the following spatial 
analysis on development trends of the banking system in Henan Province. 
Firstly, the banking system in the province started from national bank 
branches. The local banks were not established until the early 1980s. The 
first state-owned bank (PBC) in Henan province was established in 1951. 
During the centralized period, PBC acted as a public service organization. 
Its branches were bound to the governments at provincial, prefecture and 
county levels. Along with the reforms, the networks of the banking system 
became denser and complicated over time. The SOBs added 8 branches 
annually in 1951~1978, but 228 in 1986~1992. Despite the competition with 
the newly established joint stock banks and private banks since 1993, the 
annual increase in the branches of the four banks remained high (163). 
Secondly, bank branches tended to be concentrated in urban centers. For 
example, the newly established branches of the four big SOBs in the capital 
city and prefecture-level cities combined to account for 30.2 per cent in 
1951~1978, 33.8 per cent in 1979~1985, 51.1 in 1986~1992 and 68.3 per cent in 
1993~2003, of the provincial total (Table 3). By contrast, the counties and 
county-level cities suffered a decline from 69.8 to 31.7 per cent in the two 
periods respectively (Table 3). The changing patterns implied that central 
cities become more important in the regional banking system. 
Thirdly, regional differences in banking service were enlarging. The SOBs 
were almost evenly distributed among the counties before 1978, with one 
bank branch per county regardless of its population or economic size. The 
situation among the prefecture-level cities was similar except that a few 
large cities hosted slightly more branches. But after 1979, the difference 
between prefectures was enlarged in terms of the number of bank branches. 
For instance, the total branches of the after 1979, the difference between 
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TABLE 3. LOCATIONS OF THE NEW BRANCHES OF THE FOUR BIG SOBS IN HENAN 
PROVINCE IN 1951~2003 (No. %)
Note: In current Chinese administration system, under the province is the prefecture-level city, 
which is further divided by the county or the county-level city. Prefecture-level urban centre 
in the table refers to the administrative centre or the main urban centre of a prefecture-level 
city. County in the table includes county-level city.
Source: Authors’ collection from the relevant government authorities.
prefectures was enlarged in terms of the number of bank branches. For 
instance, the total branches of the four banks in Luoyang were 387, or 4.7 
times the number in Hebi. In terms of population, the branches per million 
people in Sanmenxia and Jiaozuo were 80 and 78 respectively, while those in 
Shangqiu and Zhoukou were only 22 and 23 (Fig. 1). These regional 
differences were largely related to their economic development, which will 
be demonstrated in the following quantitative analysis. 
In summary, the changing geography of banking system in Henan 
Province did not follow the “stages of banking development” theory based 
on the practice in some western economies. Although the geographical 
concentration was observed, the regional banking system did not start from 
local or regional banks. With reference to Dow’s six stages framework, the 
spatial development of the banking system in Henan since 1949 can be 
defined in two stages. The first one is the stage of even distribution of 
national branch banking system (1949~1978). The second is the stage of 
competition with other local or regional banks (such as city commercial 
banks, joint stock, and private banks) and concentration of banking services 
in urban centers (1979~2006).
　　
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS ON THE DETERMINANT FACTORS
　　
As discussed earlier, the SOBs were regarded as public service 
organizations during the planned economy (1951~1978). Thus, banks did 
not set up branches based on the rationality of market principles in financial 
operation. Instead, the distribution of the administrative units in the 
1951~1978 1979~1985 1986~1992 1993~2003
The capital City 35(15.5) 46(7.0) 136(8.5) 206(11.5)
Prefecture-level 
urban centers
33(14.7) 176(26.8) 681(42.6) 1018(56.8)
Counties 157(69.8) 435(66.2) 782(48.9) 567(31.7)
Total 225(100.0) 657(100.0) 1599(100.0) 1791(100.0)
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government hierarchy overwhelmingly determined the regional 
distribution of the bank branches. We may call this the “government 
decision effect” or “administration-bound effect” (bank branches were 
bound with administrative units). After 1979, China has gradually released 
government controls on SOBs. To make profit has been emphasized as a 
major goal of the SOBs in operation. As many Chinese banks conduct their 
business mainly in deposit-taking and credit-lending (He, 2001), therefore, 
ceteris paribus, the profit-seeking banks would be expected to locate 
branches in line with income and economic growth. If GDP can be used to 
indicate both the income and economic levels in a region, then regional GDP 
may presumably determine the number of bank branches in the region. We 
may call this the “marketing effect” or “regional economy-bound effect.” 
To test the contribution of “administration-bound effect” and “regional 
economy-bound effect” discussed earlier, we have used the panel data on 
GDP by prefecture-level regions in Henan Province (the administrative 
units under the province were prefectures or prefecture-level cities in the 
study periods) in the three years (1985, 1992 and 2003) from the Statistical 
Yearbook of Henan and the panel data we have collected on the total branches 
of the four SOBs in the three periods (1949~1985, 1986~1992 and 1993~2003) 
for the same regional basis. We have then applied the pooled OLS and Fixed 
Effect methods to estimate the econometrical models discussed above. The 
work has been processed by the software package Eviews. The following 
model has been formulated for doing the pooled OLS:
Nit + β0 + β1Yit + β2Ait + β3D03Yit + uit                                                     (3)
Where Nit is the number of branches of the four big SOBs in year t and 
region i; Nit is the GDP for region i in year t, Ait is the number of county-level 
administration units in region i (there were 5 to 15 counties, county-level 
cities or county-level districts in each prefecture-level region in the study 
periods) and year t; D03 is a dummy variable, which equals 1 for 2003, and 
zero for 1985 and 1992. The reason for us to add this dummy variable is that, 
other banks besides the four big SOBs have entered into the banking 
industry since 1992 and they contributed a substantial portion in the 
banking industry in 2003. 
From the estimated results (Table 4) of Model (3), we can draw two 
important conclusions. Firstly, the determinant factors changed in the study 
period. After 1985, the GDP had significant effect on the distribution of bank 
branches (the t statistic for Y is large enough), and the administration units 
had not significant effect on the branch distribution of banks (the t statistic 
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TABLE 4. REGRESSIONRESULT (1) FROM THE POOLED OLS MODEL
(Dependent variable: N, Included observations: 54)
TABLE 5. REGRESSION RESULT (2) FROM THE POOLED OLS MODEL
(Dependent variable: N, Included observations: 54)
for A is small enough). The economy-bound effect replaced the 
administration-bound effect. Secondly, the strength of the impact also 
changed in the period. After 1992, the GDP had a significant effect on the 
number of bank branches, but the strength of the impact was declining (the 
t statistic for D03Y reflects this fact).
We may remove the administration units as an independent variable 
since its effect is not significant. Then we obtain the estimated outcome in 
Table 5, as well as the estimated equation (4) for 1985 and 1992 and (5) for 
2003. These two equations indicates that in 1985 or 1992, the SOBs would 
increase 1.6 branches on average for the GDP increment of RMB 100 million 
yuan; however, in 2003, they would increase only 0.5 branch on average for 
the same increment of the GDP. This was largely attributable to the entries 
of other banks besides the four banks that effectively competed with the four 
SOBs.
N = 19.7 + 1l.6Y                                                                                   (4)
N = 19.7 + 1l.5Y                                                                                   (5)
Explanatory variables Coefficients t-statistic p-value
C 5.512170 0.305534 0.761
Y 1.458452 6.384285 0.000
A 2.043982 0.987717 0.328
D03Y -0.948898 -4.570662 0.000
R2=0.849278 F=93.91214
Explanatory variables Coefficients t-statistic p-value
C 19.65033 1.789853 0.079
Y 1.574200 8.029594 0.000
D03Y -1.047130 -5.747459 0.000
R2=0.846337 F=140.447
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TABLE 6. REGRESSION RESULT FROM THE FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
 (Dependent variable: ΔN, Included observations: 54)
Note: The number of observations should be reduced after differentiation. However, we add the 
data in 1978 here. The differential data reflect the changes after 1978.
The pooled OLS model produces R2=0.85, which indicates our model fits 
very well the observed values. However, to avoid the errors from missing 
important explanatory variables, we add an unobservable Fi into Model (3). 
This variable is sensitive by regions but constant over periods. Then, Model 
(3) becomes:
Nit = β0 + β1Yit + β2Ait + β3D03Yit + Fi + uit                                                  (6)
Differentiate Model (6) with respect to time t:
ΔNit = β1ΔYit + β2ΔAit + β3D03ΔYit + Δuit                                                  (7)
We use OLS to estimate Equation (7) and obtain the outcome of fixed 
effect model (Table 6). This outcome further validates our first conclusion; 
the t-statistics for ΔY and ΔA show that the effect of the regional economy is 
significant but that of administration units is not significant. It also makes 
the second conclusion clearer; when D03 = 1, ΔY represents the difference in 
GDP between 2003 and 1992, the t-statistic for D03ΔY reflects the declining in 
the strength of the effect of the regional economy. 
EVIDENCE FROM THE INTERVIEWS
In the survey form we listed ten locational factors based on information 
from our interviews with people in the head offices of the four big SOBs. 
During the survey we asked the interviewees to assess the significance 
levels of the factors in affecting their branches’ location. The assessment was 
designed to have five categories ― the most important, very important, 
Explanatory variables coefficients t-statistic p-value
Y 1.816892 10.04108 0.000
A -2.691692 -0.406377 0.686
D03Y -1.525994 -8.269501 0.000
R2=0.510161 2R =0.49095
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important, ordinary and irrelevant. Among the ten factors, “development 
policy” and “government decision” are related to government preference, 
while others mainly reflect market principles. Results from 58 sample 
branches were used to test whether bank locations followed government’s 
preference or market rules.
Survey results indicate that “transportation,” “resident’s income level,” 
“proximity to residential areas” and “proximity to big companies, 
government and non-government organizations” were evaluated as 
important factors in determining the bank branch’s location. Those 
assessing the factors as the most important and very important combined 
counted for 79.3, 61.2, 56.9 and 46.6 per cent in the total samples respectively 
(Table 7). Obviously, all these factors are directly related to the number and 
business capacity of bank customers, except “transportation” factor that 
affects the accessibility of customers. Public transportation has been the 
dominant means of transportation in China.  
By contrast, “development policy” and “government decision” had weak 
influence on location selection. Those assessing the factors as irrelevant 
counted for 43.1 and 60.3 per cent in the total samples respectively (Table 7). 
Government “development policy” only affected several branches in the 
newly developing districts; thus, its overall assessment was reasonably low. 
Similarly, since those established in the rigorous planned economy only 
TABLE 7. ASSESSMENT OF LOCATION FACTORS BY THE SAMPLES IN THE FOUR BIG SOBS 
IN ZHENGZHOU (N = 58)(%)
Note: Figure in the table is the percentage of each category in one factor.
Locational factors Irrelevant Ordinary Important Veryimportant
Most
important
Transportation 5.2 5.2 10.3 53.4 25.9
Rent and labor cost 5.2 44.8 25.9 18.9 5.2
Space availability 18.9 31.0 25.9 20.7 3.5
Proximity to big companies, government
and non-government organizations
10.3 31.0 12.1 25.9 20.7
Resident’s income level 8.6 13.8 15.5 17.3 44.8
Proximity to commercial centers
and recreation sites
22.4 20.6 19.0 5.2 32.8
Development policy 43.1 17.3 13.7 17.3 8.6
Following others 70.7 12.1 6.9 10.3 0
Government decisions 60.3 17.2 5.2 12.1 5.2
Proximity to residential areas 15.5 12.1 15.5 22.4 34.5
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accounted for a small share in the samples as well as in the total branches, 
the impact of “government decision” on the branch’s locations in general 
was also very weak. 
Since the operational environment have remarkably changed in the past 
half century, it will be necessary to analyze the influence of locational factors 
against the changing background. The results become more striking after 
we have broken the data into three periods, 1951~1978, 1979~1992 and 
1993~2003 (Table 8). Some factors were constantly significant in the three 
periods, while others playing different roles over periods.
“Transportation” was regarded as a very important locational factor in 
the entire three periods. Those assessing the factor as the most important 
and very important counted for 80.0, 82.6, and 76.7 per cent of the total 
samples in the three periods respectively (Table 8). Some other factors are 
highly sensitive to the changes in operational environment of banking 
service. For example, “resident’s income level” became an important 
locational factor only after China’s reforms in 1978. Those assessing the 
factor as the most important and very important were zero in 1951~1978, but 
increased to 65.2 and 56.7 per cent of the total samples in 1979~1992 and 
1993~2003 respectively (Table 8). This reflects the importance of market 
force in determining bank locations after the banks changed from 
TABLE 8. LOCATIONAL FACTORS AND THEIR IMPORTANCE ASSESSED BY THE SAMPLES 
IN THE FOUR BIG SOBS IN ZHENGZHOU IN THREE PERIODS (N=58)(No, %)
Note: No. in the table refers to the number of sampling bank branches that assessed the respective 
factor as the most important and very important factors. The percentage was calculated by 
the No. as percentage of the total samples in the respective period.
Locational factors
1951~1978 1979~1992 1993~2003
No. % No. % No. %
Transportation 4 80 19 82.6 23 76.7
Rent and labour cost 1 20 4 17.3 9 30.0
Space availability 0 0 6 26.1 8 26.7
Proximity to big companies, government
and non-government organizations
1 20 10 43.3 16 53.3
Resident’s income level 0 0 15 65.2 17 56.7
Proximity to commercial centers and
recreation sites
1 20 9 39.1 12 12.4
Development policy 1 20 5 21.7 9 30.0
Following others 1 20 5 21.7 4 13.4
Government decisions 4 80 3 13.4 3 8.7
Proximity to residential areas 2 40 16 69.6 15 50.0
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government organizations to commercial entities. For the same reason, 
“government decisions” as a locational factor was remarkably diminishing 
in the three periods. Those assessing the factor as the most important and 
very important counted for 80 per cent of the total samples in 1951~1978, 
declining to 13.4 per cent in 1979~1992 and 8.7 per cent in 1993~2003 (Table 
8). The remarkable decline in government influence on bank locations 
consists with the quantitative results in the early section of the paper.
CONCLUSIONS
This study indicates that in a less developed region of China, locations of 
bank branches were geographically centralized during the study period. 
Many new branches were established throughout Henan Province, and 
regional banking networks became denser and more complex. These new 
bank branches were concentrated in central cities, particularly in the cities of 
fast growth regions. Consequently, urban centers came to dominate the 
regional banking system. In terms of new branches of the four big SOBs, the 
proportion of these cities in the provincial total increased from 30.2 per cent 
in 1951~1978 to 68.3 per cent in 1993~2003. Within the provincial capital city 
of Zhengzhou, however, the changing spatial patterns of the banking 
system tended to accompany geographical expansion of the urban area. 
Empirical evidence from the study reveals some differences to the stage 
process described by Chick (1986) and Dow (1999). Firstly, the regional 
banking system started from the spread of national bank branches, rather 
than local or regional banks. In the early stage of banking development 
(1949~1978), the national branch banking service was fairly evenly 
distributed in Henan Province. Secondly, the dramatic institutional reforms 
rapidly transformed the banking system. Several local or regional banks, 
such as city commercial banks, joint stock banks and private banks, were 
established. Under the increasing competition, profit-seeking was elevated 
as the main operational logic of SOBs. Geographically, this process was 
accompanied by the concentration of banking services in urban centers. 
Therefore, we argue that the different banking practices in the specific 
circumstances may extend the stage theory of banking development. We 
also argue that the tendency of spatial evolution in a regional banking 
system rests on its geographical scale. For example, the changing trends 
between Henan Province as a whole and its capital city showed a marked 
contrast during the same period. Thus, we should be cautious in drawing 
conclusions on the spatial evolution of banking system without 
consideration of the scale of a region. 
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Evidence from this study lends supports to the crucial role of institutions 
and institutional reforms in shaping the regional banking system. During 
the planned-economy period, banks were actually government 
departments. Thus, the number of bank branches in a prefecture was closely 
related to the number of administrative units in a prefecture in Henan 
Province. The geography of the banking system during this period 
resembled the geography of the hierarchy of government structure. Along 
with the transition to a market economy, particularly the government 
deregulation and the bank’s institutional reforms, the SOBs have been 
gradually converting into commercial financial institutions. Their locations 
have therefore been guided by market principles. Empirical data from our 
interviews with 58 bank branches in Zhengzhou indicate that “government 
decisions” were a significant locational factor in 1951~1978, but had only 
weak influence thereafter. By contrast, factors related to financial markets, 
such as “resident’s income level” and “proximity to big companies, 
government and non-government organizations” started to exercise their 
strong influence only after China’s reforms in 1978. The remarkable changes 
in the effects of locational factors have been further proved by a quantitative 
analysis. By using the pooled OLS and Fixed Effect models and statistical 
data in Henan Province, we have demonstrated that the administrative 
units failed to be a significant locational factor in 1985~2003. Instead, 
regional GDP had a strong influence on spatial patterns of the banking 
system during the period. This was shown at highly significant statistical 
levels. In other words, regional GDP replaced regional administration units 
as an important locational factor after the reforms, while beneath this 
replacement lay government deregulation and the banks’ institutional 
reforms. The findings provide comparison with other studies that attribute 
information flows as the determinant factors of China’s national financial 
centers (Zhao at al., 2004).
Not surprisingly, rapid institutional changes produced many striking 
changes in the regional banking system in China. The most noticeable one is 
that numerous bank branches were established in a short period. For 
example, 1,599 new branches of the four big SOBs mushroomed in 
1986~1992 in Henan Province, and 82 new branches were added to the city 
of Zhengzhou alone in 1993. After a period of fast growth, the restructuring 
of banking system should follow normally. But we have not seen this sign in 
terms of spatial shift of bank branches. In the interviews with senior officials 
of Henan branches of the four banks, we were told that their business focus 
was moving from the entire province to some target cities. They have planed 
to relocate some branches in these target areas (due to the rigorous process 
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in approving a new bank branch, they would prefer relocation of the 
branches that are not profitable rather than closure). Therefore, it is expected 
that the restructuring of banking system will occur soon. 
This study only draws on evidence from the four big SOBs. Obviously this 
is only one part, albeit the main part, of the regional banking system. Other 
banks including the joint-stock banks, private banks, and city commercial 
banks have been growing rapidly in recent years. Along with the operation 
of foreign banks in China’s inland areas from the end of 2006, the SOBs will 
be facing stronger competition. The regional banking system in the inland 
areas is expected to be more complicated in the near future. 
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